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Chapter 1: Spies Before the War
The Soviet Union and the United States have always had a complicated
relationship. When the Bolshevik Revolution of 1921 brought the communist party to
power in Russia, the United States government did not recognize the new regime. The
communist ideologies of the newly established state did not line up well with the
democratic ideals of the United States. These new communist principles threatened the
strength of the American system, as labor disputes and the Great Depression gave citizens
reason to question capitalism’s effectiveness. The fear of this system grew as the world
progressed through the twentieth century when the Soviet Union shifted from ally to
enemy in all but a few years.
Although the two countries may not have seen eye to eye, the American
government was not particularly concerned with the issues of Soviet Russia after it was
founded in December of 1922. Although World War I had shown that the United States
could hold its own on the international stage, it still had yet to develop into the dominant
world power that it would become after the Second World War. Despite the political
tension that was felt from both countries, the two maintained an economic relationship.
For instance, during the late 1920s the Soviet Union was “America’s seventh-biggest
customer and its largest foreign purchaser of industrial machinery.”1 After all, both
countries were growing and trying to establish themselves as two of the most powerful
nations in the world, and this economic tie helped both of them achieve this goal.
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Regardless of the economic relationship that was developing between the Soviet
Union and the United States, there was still an obvious layer of distrust that both
exhibited. As John F. Fox explains, Vladimir Lenin was very concerned about the status
of Soviet intelligence in the United States in the early 1920s.2 However, the American
counterintelligence efforts in the 1920s and 1930s were very limited and basically
inactive until the latter half of the thirties. Therefore, Soviet spy networks started to
develop under the noses of U.S. officers. As Historians John Earl Haynes and Harvey
Klehr explain in their book Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America “Soviet
success, in other words, was not due solely to KGB skill, but also benefited from
American incompetence and indifference.” 3 The Soviets spies usually consisted of
Americans who were either sympathetic to the communist cause or who needed money.
Soviet spying began in the late twenties and continued on throughout the majority of the
twentieth century. However, the spies that gave information before World War II usually
gave over information for ideological reasons.
The Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) was created after the Soviet
Revolution and many of the Americans that spied for ideological reasons got their start
within this organization. The Party went through many changes and compromises at the
beginning of its inception. In 1920, the Party was divided between two parties, the
CPUSA and the Communist Labor Party. Due to the infighting between these factions,
the Communist International (Comintern) stepped in and forced the groups to merge.4
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Despite the early struggles between factions of the Party, it continued to develop and
created a strong illegal wing when Earl Browder became its General Secretary in 1932.
The Soviet spy networks that developed before the Second World War were not
as extensive as they would be during the war years. However, they did collect some
valuable information on machinery and about the American perspective on other
countries. 5 The AMTORG Trading Company covered for Soviet espionage, which
allowed their American spies to collect valuable information on industry, such as details
on Ford and other significant manufacturers of the time.6 AMTORG not only provided
crucial intelligence back to the Soviet Union, but it also became a hub for new agents like
Gaik Ovakimian, Harold Glasser, and Jacob Golos.
In addition, many other networks developed through the Communist Party of the
United States, like the one Whittaker Chambers was involved in. However, this cycle
eventually broke when Chambers confessed to being a Soviet spy to the FBI in the late
1930s. Another network was centered on Soviet agent, and GRU leader, Alfred Tilton,
whose apparatus included important men like Nicolas Dozenberg and Earl Browder. A
similar agent, named Ludwig Lore, also recruited various agents to work for branches of
Soviet intelligence during the twenties and thirties. However, despite their years of
service, and whether they were involved with the CPUSA or not, many of these Soviet
spies died or were arrested during Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s.7 Nevertheless, while
there was a myriad of Soviet spies that tried to provide information back to the USSR
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during this time period, the majority of significant Soviet espionage occurred during and
after World War II.

One of the most significant early forms of Soviet espionage started with the
AMTORG Trading Company. Ironically, this first major base for covert Soviet relations
happened because the Soviet Union was not recognized by the United States and
therefore did not have an embassy before 1933. Therefore, Amtorg became the hub for
many Soviet operations and thousands of Russians entered America between 1924 and
1930 with the help of this company.8 In his piece “Stealing America’s Know-How: The
Story of AMTORG,” Henry Zelchenko describes how he was enlisted and then worked
for Amtorg. When Ivan A. Likhachov approached Zelchenko during the early 1930s,
Zelchenko did not know of what use he could be to Likhachov.9 However, he quickly
learned that Amtorg was trying to recruit as many suitable agents as they could to gain
information on American industry, thus helping the Soviet Union catch up to America’s
performance.10 Zelchenko explained Amtorg’s month-long processes of exploring and
collecting data on different commercial industries through visits to their headquarters.11
Amtorg targeted many US companies, like Buick and TOCCO, and eventually the
Russians were able to see the reward.12 As Zelchenko notes, “all the data that had been
collected, studied and perfected by an American company through years of trial and error
and at heavy cost the Russians were to obtain free, wrapped up in a neat package.”13
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Nevertheless, obtaining this industrial knowledge was not the whole of Amtorg’s
purpose. Zelchenko concludes his paper by explaining the other functions that the
company provided to both the Communist Party and the Soviet cause in general. Amtorg
not only gave funds to the Party, but they also functioned as the main cover for spies
from the Soviet government.14 In addition, Zelchenko finishes by explaining that the
Soviet “industrial progress rests on imitation of foreign achievements. Without a ready
and continuous influx of American and other foreign machines and technical knowledge,
Soviet industry would quickly become sterile.”15 During the 1930s the Soviet Union was
in the midst of a major industrialization movement, which explains their focus on
American industrial knowledge. Furthermore, this flow of information would certainly be
helpful to the Soviet cause in years to come, as their espionage allowed them to build an
atomic bomb in a much shorter time then they would have been able to without spying on
the American efforts.
Amtorg was one of the primary vehicles for Soviet espionage in the early period
before World War II. However, it did garner a lot of suspicion from various different
American sources. For example, the New York Police Commissioner inquired about the
real objectives of Amtorg. In 1930, Grover Whalen led an investigation because he
believed the company was “harboring thirty undercover agents of the Communist
International.”16 Unfortunately, Amtorg escaped this questioning without ramifications
and continued to bring in Soviet agents and collect information on American products.17
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One of the most significant acts of espionage for Amtorg was not what they
collected, but whom they covered for. In 1933, Gaik Ovakimian came to the United
States under the cover of an Amtorg engineer, but was really the deputy head of the
NKVD’s (the Soviet Union’s secret police) scientific-technical intelligence section.18
Ovakimian is immensely significant not only because of the information he brought in,
but also because of the Americans that he recruited to be Soviet spies. For example,
Ovakimian recruited Jacob Golos who would be in charge of some of the most important
spies, such as the Rosenberg ring, during World War II.19 Furthermore, Ovakimian
recruited “an impressive array of technical and industrial informants in the chemical
industry,” like Thomas Lessing Black, who began in the mid-1930s and was an important
agent during the war years when he worked as a chemist.20 Another important asset that
Ovakimian recruited was Harold Glasser in the later part of the 1930s.
Glasser joined the Justice Department in 1935. He was very effective spy because
he had access to “Justice Department files (including those of the FBI) but also to reports
from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.”21 Glasser’s position
allowed him to not only report on issues of foreign intelligence, but it also enabled him to
warn the KGB when the FBI was going to investigate fellow spy Jacob Golos and his
network, the World Tourists.22 This was especially important because the World Tourists
were such a valuable faction of Soviet espionage. The World Tourists worked with both
Amtorg and the CPUSA to help Soviet agents enter into the United States by providing
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them with fake passports and deceitful travel information.23 Golos was the primary owner
of the organization, which made him a lot of money until he, as well as the World
Tourists, were brought under investigation by the FBI in 1940.24 Thankfully Glasser
warned the Soviet system of this investigation and the organization was able to change its
tune in time to only receive “a slap on the wrist.”25 Despite his hard work, Glasser’s
service was suspended in 1938 by the Soviet Union when his main contact, Armand
Feldman, disappeared and presumably defected.26 Unfortunately for both the Soviets and
Glasser, their suspicions were correct. Feldman went to Canada to escape his former
colleagues, but was too apprehensive about returning to the United States to testify.27
Therefore, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police brought Feldman back to America in
1940 where he was forced to testify. 28 However, Feldman played down Glasser’s
involvement and Glasser was able to escape the investigation only having lost his job.29
Ovakimian was a successful station chief because he was able to recruit
Americans who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union into working for Soviet
intelligence. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr explain how in 1936 Richard Briggs
“approached Amtorg about obtaining a position in the Soviet Union and met Ovakimyan.
Just like with Thomas Black, Ovakimyan soon converted the job seeker into an industrial
spy [sic].”30 Ovakimian was station chief until 1941 when the FBI arrested him after
Feldman testified; however, at this point Ovakimian had been a very valuable asset to
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Soviet intelligence, allowing their covert network to grow into an effective machine that
would function throughout World War II.

Amtorg and Gaik Ovakimian were two of the most important Soviet intelligence
assets during the pre-war era. However, they were not the only ones. Another very
significant Soviet agent during the twenties and thirties was Alfred Tilton (or Tilden).
Tilton was head of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency, for a time during the
twenties. Tilton and his wife worked in the United States from 1927 to 1930, where they
operated using “bootlegged passports” as they did not have any diplomatic support at this
time (since the Soviet Union was still not recognized by the United States).31 Tilton not
only procured these forms of false identification for himself, but he did so for other
agents as well.32 While Tilton did provide some important information back to the Soviet
government, like the lay out of the British warship Royal Oak, much of his more
significant work came from his recruitment of valuable spies like Nicolas Dozenberg.33
Before Tilton approached Dozenberg, he worked for the Communist newspaper
Voice of Labor based in Chicago. He was a functionary for the CPUSA during the 1920s,
but was unhappy about his level of pay and approached the Party for help.34 Dozenberg
met Tilton under the auspices of his false name, Joseph Paquett, where he received his
first assignment. 35 This first assignment seemed quite reasonable to Dozenberg. As
Theodore Draper explains in his book American Communism and Soviet Russia,
“according to Dozenberg, his first assignment seemed innocent enough – to interview
31
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people who could be sent to Soviet Russia for various purposes and to report on them to
Tilton.”36 He was paid an increased stipend for this work, but claimed he was unaware
that this qualified as espionage. 37 Nevertheless, in late 1927 Nicolas Dozenberg
disappeared and a new identity, “Nicolas L. Dallant,” was created. As Draper confirms,
Dallant was probably the “first American Communist to make the transition to Soviet
military intelligence. Tilton, however, was probably not the first Soviet intelligence agent
in the United States.”38 Dozenberg worked mostly in recruiting more agents and setting
up their cover stories in the United States. When asked why he decided to engage in this
type of work his response was complex, yet many other agents most likely felt the same
way. Dozenberg explained that it was “partly convictions, and partly once you run into a
game of that sort, well, it becomes so regular that you don’t pay any attention to it…”39
So, while his participation as a spy was spurred by his need for money, it was maintained
because of his sympathy for communism.
Nevertheless, Dozenberg’s involvement in Soviet espionage was not without
consequence. The FBI arrested Dozenberg in September 1939 after Benjamin Gitlow
provided his name in testimony to the House of Representatives’ Special Committee on
Un-American Activities.40 Gitlow was a former socialist who became an anti-communist
at the end of the 1930s and provided information to HUAC as a result.41 Martin Dies, the
head of HUAC, questioned Dozenberg in an attempt to gauge a better understanding of
what Dozenberg did and whom else he was connected to. Dies asked Dozenberg about
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Tilton and other agents like Jay Lovestone and Earl Browder for whom he had provided
false identification.42 Dozenberg confirmed that he worked with Tilton and that the two
had set up a shipping company that would “serve the purpose of shipping whatever
material the people here had gathered.”43 Dozenberg confirmed his involvement with
many different Soviet spies and helped Martin Dies understand Alfred Tilton’s network.
Dozenberg went to prison for a year and a day because of his passport fraud and then
returned to the Soviet Union.44 While Dozenberg was able to make it out with only one
year of prison, his primary contact was not as lucky. Alfred Tilton was recalled to Russia
in 1930 and was arrested in 1937 during Stalin’s Great Terror. Tilton served fifteen years
in the Gulag (Russian prison/concentration camps) where he died of starvation and other
circumstances in 1942.45 Tilton would not be the only Soviet agent to suffer this fate, as
Stalin became increasingly paranoid about agents who had spent any time working
overseas, especially in the West.

The Communist Party of the United States fostered the recruitment and
development of many Americans working as Soviet spies during the 1920s and especially
the 1930s. The CPUSA had a troubled beginning as it worked to establish itself and set
its goals. During late 1919 the Party functioned legally as it worked to gain more
supporters who believed that a Revolution could happen in the United States as it had in
the Soviet Union.46 However, as time went on bombings and other threats forced the
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Party to go underground.47 Leadership was passed around for another couple of years
until the Communist International (the Soviet organization that oversaw the Communist
parties of the world) told them to return to the legal sphere and establish themselves as a
legitimate Party.48 Throughout the 1920s the CPUSA functioned legally, while it tried to
develop its Secret wing. As Haynes and Klehr discuss in their book Venona, “during the
1920s the American party had an underground, but, distracted as it was by its vicious
internal factional battles, its covert apparatus was not carefully maintained.” 49 The
CPUSA’s undercover section would not function well until the 1930s when Josef Peters
led the secret faction.
Josef Peters (whose real name was Alexander Stevens) was a Hungarian born
communist who moved to the United States in 1924.50 Peters joined the CPUSA when he
arrived and was quickly became involved in the factional disputes of the Party. Peters
was a follower of the very controversial Jay Lovestone who was a supporter of Nikolai
Bukharin. Bukharin was at one point one of Stalin’s greatest allies; however, he was
purged from Soviet leadership in 1929. This led to Lovestone’s, along with other
minority faction’s, expulsion from the Party. 51 However, after the CPUSA was
“cleansed” of these smaller groups, it was able to grow because of its singular beliefs. In
1930, Peters was promoted to “organizational secretary of the New York Communist
Party, the CPUSA’s largest regional unit.” 52 Peters reported to Earl Browder, the
CPUSA’s General Secretary, where they worked together to develop an effective
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espionage unit within the Party. Peters was responsible for “detecting surveillance by
hostile police, exposing infiltrators, and protecting special party assets, such as sensitive
records, from seizure.”53 Despite all of these significant duties, one of the most important
jobs of Peters was to facilitate communication between the underground and different
covert groups working within Washington.
When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the New Deal, he believed
that it would help the American people recover from the Great Depression; however, it
unwittingly also became a system through which Soviet espionage networks were
developed. The Agricultural Adjustment Agency (AAA) was one of the programs that
FDR created as a way to help rebuild the agricultural sector of States. While this did
occur, it also provided some Soviet agents with a gateway into US information. These
agents had to break with the Communist Party when they got involved in the government
or else they would be discharged.54 Nevertheless, the Party maintained an important role
in their espionage, as the CPUSA facilitated many of the relationships that agents had
when working for these government agencies. For example, Harold Ware and his group
of Soviet spies developed through the AAA and his work with the CPUSA.55 J. Peters
introduced Ware to Whittaker Chambers in 1934, whose network already included
seventy-five other agents working within the government.56 Some of the most notorious
alleged spies of the Ware group were Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, John Abt, Charles
Kramer, Nathan Witt, Henry Collins, George Silverman, Donald Hiss, and Victor Perlo.57
However, Harold Ware died in 1935 and Earl Browder took over his contacts. This group
53
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continued to collect information over the years, until one of their own came forward to
the United States Government about their actions.
One of the most notorious Soviet spies of the era before World War II became
famous of his own accord. In 1938, Whittaker Chambers defected from the communist
cause and provided information to the American government on Soviet intelligence. In
1952, Chambers published his book Witness that told the story of his involvement both
within the Communist Party and communist underground. On page 201, Chambers
describes his induction into the CPUSA in 1925. He had decided that he wanted to join
and was approached by what he called a “glassy-eyed communist” who questioned him
briefly about why he wanted membership.58 Chambers explained that he “believed that
Communism was the answer to the social crisis and that [he] wanted to do something
about it.” 59 After reading a couple of recommended communist writings, Chambers
became an official party member. Chambers was active in the Communist Party and
wrote for and edited for two popular communist papers titled New Masses and The Daily
Worker. Chambers played an important role in the CPUSA, but was approached seven
years later for a new opportunity in the same cause.
Chambers recalls the experience of being approached for his new job in his book
Witness. Comrade Bedacht called Chambers in to have a meeting with him about what
his new possible role would be. Chambers recollects his initial meeting with Bedacht as a
little disconcerting:
“For some reason,” he said, as if he strongly disapproved of the whole
business, “they want you to go into one of the party’s ‘special
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institutions.’” Bedacht always used that expression in referring to any of
the Communist underground apparatuses. But it was a term new to me.60
Chambers acknowledged how hesitant Bedacht was to offer him this position, but
Chambers himself was also nervous about this new offer and initially declined.
Nevertheless, as Chambers further explains, he had no choice in the matter; if he decided
to refuse the offer he would be expelled from the Party.61 Thus Chambers joined the
Soviet underground in 1931 where he worked secretly for seven years until he turned
himself in to the FBI.
Chambers was an important agent for the Soviets as he was not only involved in
military, but also political espionage. Chambers was responsible for gaining access to and
reporting back to the Soviet Union on companies like Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey
and the Electric Boat Company in Connecticut.62 Chamber’s political espionage took
place at the Agricultural Adjustment Agency, where he worked to gain information with
other Soviet agents such as “Julian Wadleigh at the Department of Agriculture, Ward
Pigman at the Bureau of Standards, Alger Hiss, then a liaison to the Senate’s Nye
Committee, and Harry Dexter White at the Treasury Department.”63 While Chambers
was involved in Soviet espionage he functioned as a very valuable asset in their system.
However, Chambers became anxious during the late half of the thirties when Stalin’s
Great Terror began and ultimately decided to leave the Communist party and go into
hiding with his family. Almost a decade later Chambers testified against other agents that
he had previously worked with in the Soviet espionage system.
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Chamber’s testimony implicated the rest of the Ware group in spying for the
Soviet Union. While many of these spies confirmed his allegations, Alger Hiss
maintained his innocence. After Chambers accused Hiss of being in contact with him and
thus committing espionage for the Soviet Union, Hiss sent a telegram to the House of UnAmerican Activities Committee stating:
“I DO NOT KNOW MR. CHAMBERS AND, SO FAR AS I AM
AWARE, HAVE NEVER LAID EYES ON HIM. THERE IS NO BASIS
FOR THE STATEMENTS ABOUT ME MADE TO YOUR
COMMITTEE....I
WOULD
FURTHER
APPRECIATE
THE
OPPORTUNITY OF APPEARING BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE...”64
However, this only made Chambers continue to provide information on his relationship
with Hiss and his wife. Hiss charged Chambers with a slander suit, but Chambers
responded by providing HUAC with documents of correspondence between himself and
Hiss. 65 Unfortunately for Hiss, Chambers evidence against him did not end there.
Nicknamed “the pumpkin papers” by the media, Chambers brought HUAC investigators
to his farm where he revealed his possession of film that incriminated Hiss with perjury
inside of a hollowed out pumpkin.
Despite all of Chambers’ evidence, Hiss was unable to be convicted of espionage
because the statue of limitations for espionage was only five years and the evidence that
was presented was ten years old.66 Nevertheless, Hiss was tried for perjuring himself in
court and served forty-four months of a five-year sentence for his crimes.67 Even though
Hiss was not convicted for espionage, the publicity of his trial made him one of the first
and most notorious Americans accused of spying for the Soviet Union.
64
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Joseph Stalin’s leadership within the Soviet Union was extremely harsh. He
molded the communist ideals of the Soviet Revolution into an autocratic society that he
ruled. He battled the constant paranoia that those closest to him would try to overthrow
his regime, and throughout his tenure in office he carried out many purges of Soviet
government officials. Alfred Tilton was one of the spies that suffered the consequence of
Stalin’s delusions. As John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr explain in their book Spies:
The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America, “The terror Stalin unleashed in the USSR
beginning in 1934 consumed much of the leadership and large portions of the rank-andfile of the Soviet Communist Party. The KGB was both its chief instrument and one of its
major victims.”68
Juliet Stuart Poyntz was another one of the Soviet agents that suffered this
unfortunate fate. Poyntz was a member of both the Daughters of the Revolution and was
a founding member of the Communist Party of the United States.69 Poyntz sought out
secret intelligence work and in 1934 she stopped working for the CPUSA and started to
work for the OGPU (the Soviet military secret police). Poyntz’s fellow colleague and
friend, Benjamin Gitlow, described what happened to Juliet in his 1948 book The Whole
of Their Lives. Poyntz was an accomplished spy: she collected details about “scientific
information in the United States in the fields of chemistry and physics, which the OGPU
considered of great importance to the industrial and military strength of Russia.” 70
Despite her success, Poyntz was not going to escape Stalin’s purges. Gitlow described
how Poyntz’ good friend and former lover, Shachno Epstein, led her to her death out of
68
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fear of what would happen to him if he chose not to.71 Rumors had started that Poyntz
was writing about her experiences as a spy and might defect, so Stalin and his associates
decided to take action.72
Epstein and Poyntz went on a walk together through Central Park where she was
grabbed and thrown into a car.73 Gitlow retells how the Soviet agent had killed her in a
disturbingly detailed fashion,
how they had driven her up through Westchester into Dutchess County to
some woods not far from the Roosevelt estate – how the pleading, crying,
frantic girl was killed and buried in a deep gully. The body was covered
with lime and dirt. On top were placed dead leaves and branches, which
the three killers trampled down with their feet. He ended his story: “Ah,
she was too beautiful, comrades. Too bad we had to kill her.”74
This terrifying story epitomizes the brutality with which Stalin conducted his purges.
Unfortunately for himself, he destroyed many of the intelligence networks that he had
developed before World War II. Not all of the agents were purged, but there would have
to be a significant rebuilding of the espionage systems so that the Soviets could have
coherent and effective information provided to them during and after the war.
The 1920s and 1930s was an era of careless American counterintelligence, which
allowed for Soviet espionage efforts to expand. This paved the way for many spies, like
Thomas Lessing Black and Harry Gold, to continue to work well into World War II after
getting their start in espionage during the thirties. The 1930s were a time when the Soviet
Union gained valuable information on industrial progress that was being made by the
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United States, which in turn helped it develop its aircraft, electronics, and chemical
know-how during Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan.75
Chapter 2: The Wartime Spies
World War II started in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland and for the next
six years many countries were engulfed in heated battle. The United States joined the war
effort in 1941 on the side of the Allies (England and the Soviet Union) in an effort to
defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan. However, while the United States and the British were
partners with the Soviet Union, they also did not always agree on everything. Throughout
the war the Soviet Union had intelligence officers working within the United States and
Britain collecting data on classified information. These spies gathered industrial,
technological, and chemical knowledge that pushed their progress forward.
Nevertheless, some of the most important intelligence was stolen from a project
that the American people did not even know of. The Manhattan Project was an initiative
to create a bomb that could destroy a whole city at once. The construction of the bomb
took place in the United States and was backed by its allies, Britain and Canada.
However, ever since two of these bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagaski, foreign affairs have never been the same. Nevertheless, without
the full knowledge of the devastation that an atomic bomb could create, both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union pined for the chance to develop a weapon like this first. Therefore, the
Soviet Union employed scientists, Soviet agents, and members of the Communist Party to
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covertly obtain intelligence of the bomb from the Manhattan Project, which allowed them
to complete their bomb years earlier than they would have been able to previously.76
Many of the agents that were gathering information from the United States were
effective at remaining anonymous during their tenure working as a spy for the USSR.
While some of the main spy rings were dissolved because agents chose to defect back to
the United States, others were cracked open through the relentless work of those who
deciphered the cables between Moscow and its New York Station. This initiative was
named the Venona Project and it gave the United States counterintelligence network
many clues as to what it was doing wrong. While the U.S. government was aware of what
these cables said they did not release them to the public until 1995 (only a few years after
the communist regime collapsed). It is through these cables that we are now able to see
how the Soviet government infiltrated the work of these top secret U.S. agencies, which
ultimately gave the USSR information that would shape how international affairs were
conducted during the Cold War.

One of the most important Soviet agents during World War II actually started his
espionage work before the conflict erupted. Jacob Golos (briefly mentioned in Chapter 1)
was a Ukrainian born immigrant to the United States, who became a naturalized citizen in
1915. From an early age Golos sympathized with leftist policies and joined the
Communist Party of America in 1919.77 In that same year Golos left the United States
and went to Russia for four years, until he returned to the United States and started to
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work with the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). 78 When he started
working for the Party he wrote for the Russian-language journals Novy Mir, but it would
not be long until he was promoted to chief administrator for the Society for Technical
Aid to Soviet Russia.79 Nevertheless, Golos’ most important work for the Soviet Union
was still yet to come.
In June of 1927 Jacob Golos (codenamed ‘Sound’) became the chief official of
the new travel agency, the World Tourists. The World Tourists worked with the CPUSA
to help with the international travel of Soviet agents from the USSR to the United States
(or vice versa) by providing falsified travel documents and identification.80 However, like
many other pre-war Soviet agents, Golos was almost purged during the late 1930s. He
was asked to return back to the Soviet Union, but evaded their requests and actually
ended up building up his networks instead.81 Golos expanded the World Tourists by
creating “the U.S. Service and Shipping Corporation, a party- and Soviet-funded cover
agency with the ‘ostensible business purpose’ of sending packages to Russia.”82 Through
this system, Golos ran some of the most important Soviet espionage networks of his time.
For example, Golos ran notable spy networks like the Rosenberg Network, the Perlo
Group, and the Silvermaster Network.83 However, Golos gave up his control of the
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Rosenberg network to Soviet agent, Sergey Semonov, at the urging of his Soviet
handlers, but would remain unwavering about his other networks.84
Golos kept his affiliation with the CPUSA during his tenure working within
Soviet espionage. This was a risky situation, as many agents broke ties with the Party so
that they would not come under suspicion by American intelligence. Nevertheless, Golos
was a very important source for the Soviets and it was partly because of his connections
within the CPUSA that he was so successful. As Harvey Klehr explains in his book Spies,
From 1941 until 1945 Golos and the CPUSA provided the KGB with its
most valuable political, diplomatic, military, and technical intelligence
sources. The relationship was fraught with difficulties and tensions, and
the KGB was always aware that its reliance on party-based networks
might result in catastrophe. In the short, run the risk paid off, and the years
from 1942 to 1945 were a golden age for the KGB. But later there was a
price to be paid.85
Although Golos gave the Soviet Union some of its most valuable spies, especially about
the atomic bomb, he would not live to see his work completely pay off. Golos died in
1943, which left his networks in the hands of his courier Elizabeth Bentley.
Elizabeth Bentley was an American born communist who graduated from Vassar
College and got her masters degree from Columbia University. She joined the CPUSA in
1935 and within a few years she would be working for the communist underground. Her
first job was at the Italian Library of Information, but the information she had available to
her was not of much interest to her sources. 86 Nevertheless, it was at this job that Bentley
would first meet Golos. The two had a much more complicated relationship than just that
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of informant and boss – the two were also involved romantically.87 Bentley was promoted
to Golos’ assistant in 1939, in which she would act as a courier for his sources.88 The
relationship between the two explains why Bentley was so protective over Golos’
networks after his death in 1943.
Bentley helped run both the Perlo Group and the Silvermaster network, and was
extremely reluctant to hand over her contacts after Golos death. Soviet agent Vasily
Zarubin wanted to take over her spies and give control of them to Soviet agent Iskhak
Akhmerov. However, Bentley proved to be determined and “continued to throw up
obstacles” when Zarubin tried to set up meetings with the American agents in her
networks.89 Akhmerov believed that Bentley was losing a bit of control and was very
eager for her to turn over her sources to Soviet leadership. In 1944, he reported on the
contradictions in her personality and how her mood could change in an instant.90 As her
biographer explains, she was unstable after the passing of Golos and was “depressed,
drinking excessively, and pursuing lovers of both sexes.”91 However, she eventually
turned over the Silvermaster network in 1944. At that point she was given another
handler, Anatoli Borisovich Gromov, who attempted to lure her back to the Soviet Union.
Bentley was probably right in assuming that this trip to the Soviet Union would not end
well, and she stayed in America. Bentley continued to receive pressure from her Soviet
handlers to turn over her sources to their control, which is part of the reason that she
ended up turning herself into the FBI in 1945.
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Bentley had become very anxious and suspicious in the years after Golos’ death.
Part of this was probably because of the fact that her Soviet handlers were trying to faze
her out, as they had noticed the change in her personality. Furthermore, her networks
were both extremely fragile and possibly volatile. All of her sources were old friends
from the underground and had knowledge about each other’s activities with espionage;
so, if one was caught, they were all caught.92 Bentley’s handlers were working hard to get
her to hand over her sources, but she was “embittered, lonely, and a promiscuous
alcoholic” who believed that the American government was coming for her.93 However,
Bentley could not have been more incorrect. While the FBI was investigating the World
Tourists, they had never really heard of Elizabeth Bentley and were unsure if they should
believe her story when she first approached them. Nevertheless, Bentley’s story would
actually check out with the Venona Project records once they were uncovered.
Elizabeth Bentley defected from the Soviet cause on August 23, 1945.94 As a
result of her defection, the Soviet Union had to recall its agents that had worked with
Bentley: Anatoly Gorsky, Akhmerov (chief of the illegal station), and Vladimir Pravdin
(chief of the New York Station).95 While Bentley had provided the Soviet Union with a
considerable amount of secret intelligence during her work as a spy, she would be equally
as important to the United States in their counterintelligence efforts. Bentley’s reasoning
for turning herself in was because of her growing disillusionment with communism.96
She was a young idealist when she joined the American communist movement and
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believed that communism would end discrimination. 97 However, after Golos’ death
Bentley understood where she stood within the Soviet network and believed it was time
to go “back to being a good American.”98
Bentley first went to the FBI office in New Haven, Connecticut to talk to an agent
about her information. It took her about three separate meetings until on November 7,
1945 the FBI conducted an eight-hour long interrogation in which “Bentley signed a 31page statement.”99 This investigation would go on for a few months, “resulting in a 107page final report naming more than eighty individuals.”100 Despite Bentley’s lack of hard
evidence, much of what she said checked out with what former Soviet informant,
Whittaker Chambers, said when he defected only a few months earlier in May of the
same year. Bentley’s defection was a large set back in Soviet espionage efforts. The
Americans found out that the Soviets knew about the “German battle plans, official
American assessments of the Soviet-German front, secret policy discussions on LendLease trade, and currency issues, and even ‘the approximate scheduled date of D-Day.”101
However, the American government could now monitor the networks that Bentley
confessed to knowing about. Furthermore, her trial in 1948 created a wave of suspicion
against any communist (or former communist) in the United States.
Elizabeth Bentley helped work with two important networks of spies before she
defected in 1945. Both the systems involved government employees and significant
information being passed to the Soviet Union. One of the groups that Elizabeth Bentley
came in contact with during her tenure as a Soviet spy was that of Victor Perlo. Born of
97
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Russian immigrants, Perlo eventually attended Columbia and got a degree in
Mathematics. By the late 1930s he was a prominent member of the communist
underground and would be one of the main subjects in Elizabeth Bentley’s testimony
after her defection to the FBI. In addition, Victor Perlo was an original member of the
Ware Group, which was the group that Whittaker Chambers was a part of and testified
against after his defection. Nevertheless, Perlo was also a successful economist outside of
his work with the Soviet Union. By 1943 Perlo was a senior economist at the War
Production Board and in 1945 he transferred to the Division of Monetary Research at the
Treasury Department.
Although Perlo was one of Bentley’s main victims in her testimony, she did not
work with his secret apparatus until 1943. Up until 1943 the Perlo Group consisted of
“mid-level government officials” that reported to the CPUSA.102 Earl Browder put Golos
and Bentley in contact with the group before Golos’ death, but he was only able to meet
with them once. Bentley took over Golos’ contacts after his passing, so she continued to
meet with the Perlo Group in the future. However, Bentley was only an intermediary for
the Perlo group as they transferred from reporting to CPUSA agents to reporting directly
to Soviet agents. During Bentley’s first couple of meetings with the group, she got to
meet all of the members. The Perlo Group consisted of John Abt, Perlo, Charles Kramer,
Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, Donald Wheeler, and Allan Rosenberg. Many of
these sources worked within the War Production Board or the Office of Strategic
Services.103
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Despite Bentley’s involvement with the Perlo Group, she did not have much
tangible evidence against them in her testimony. She never read the documents that the
members passed along to her, so her concrete evidence was lacking. Nevertheless, she did
recall a few facts. For example, “she remembered memoranda on aircraft production
(from Perlo), OSS intelligence summaries and OSS copies of State Department cables
(from Wheeler), and plans for the occupation of Germany (from Allan Rosenberg).”104
Regardless of Bentley’s lack of solid information, more evidence would come out about
the Perlo Group at later times that revealed what they had provided to the Soviet Union.
Venona cables confirmed much of what Bentley said and further indicted Perlo. For
example, the Venona cables revealed that
Perlo supplied data on aircraft production and US shipments to various
fronts and reports about development difficulties for a jet engine for
America’s first and very secret jet fighter, as well as information on
clashes between US military and civilian policy-makers over allocation of
economic resources.105
Other members of the Perlo apparatus collected valuable information on the international
dealings of other countries. For example, Harold Glasser reported on both Nazi and
Finnish dealings with the U.S. and with the Soviet Union.106 The Perlo Group committed
espionage throughout World War II, but it was not until 1947 that the FBI decided to take
action against them. Despite the fact that the FBI was convinced of the Perlo group’s
guilt, the Bureau did not have enough solid evidence to convict them. Therefore, the FBI
had the members of the Perlo apparatus fired or had their positions eliminated. This was
all done quietly and none of the members were persecuted for their espionage. In spite of
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their lack of conviction, evidence was later revealed through the USSR’s archives and the
Venona records that prove this group of government employees was guilty of handing
over secrets to the Soviet Union during war years.107
The other espionage apparatus that the Golos-Bentley network worked with was
that of Gregory Silvermaster. Silvermaster’s network was much like the Perlo group,
however it provided more important information back to the Soviet Union. Gregory
Silvermaster and his wife Helen ran the network, with the assistance of their friend
William Ullman. It was first operated through the Golos and Bentley partnership starting
in 1941, but by 1944 it had fully transferred over to Soviet control. The Silvermaster
network included many important government officials, like “William Taylor, George
Silverman, Frank Coe, William Gold, Sonia Gold, Irving Kaplan, Norman Bursler,
Lauchlin Currie, Anatole Volkov, and Harry Dexter White.”108
Gregory Silvermaster was an immigrant from the Soviet Union who had roots in
the Communist Party. In 1919 he joined the Party in Seattle and continued to be
outspoken about his views. Eventually he moved to California and met Earl Browder who
brought him into working with the communist underground in 1934. Silvermaster was
also a practiced government official, who had worked in a variety of departments, such as
the Resettlement Administration, the Maritime Labor Board, the Farm Security
Administration, and the Board of Economic Warfare. Ultimately Browder put Golos into
contact with Silvermaster so that the two could expand covert work together in
Washington.109 Silvermaster’s network reported to Golos and Bentley until 1944 when
Silvermaster began reporting to Soviet agent Akhmerov. Silvermaster consistently came
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under suspicion by curious government employees, but his connections within the
government were strong enough that others within his secret network would bail him out
if need be.
Silvermaster’s importance to the Soviet cause cannot be understated. He not only
collected information on his own, but he gathered secrets from his network that would
prove very useful to the Soviet Union. The KGB not only awarded Silvermaster with a
three thousand dollar bonus at the end of 1944, but they also awarded him with a medal
because of his work for the USSR.110 Sixty-one Venona messages show that Silvermaster
handed “over huge quantities of War Production Board data on weapons, aircraft, tank,
artillery, and shipping production; Board of Economic Warfare documents on German
industry and on American reserves of manpower, foodstuffs, and raw materials…” to
name a shortened list of all he collected.111 Silvermaster was one of the most crucial
Soviet spies within the U.S. Government during the war period also because of the spies
that worked for him.
Silvermaster’s partner, William Ullman, was not only of great use to the U.S.
government, but he was also a valuable asset to the Soviet government’s underground.
Ullman and the Silvermasters were not only business partners, but they were practically
like family. Ullman met Gregory Silvermaster in 1935 when he started his job at the
National Recovery Administration. However, by 1939 he was working under Harry
Dexter White (another source in the Silvermaster network) in the Pentagon at the
Treasury’s Division of Monetary Research. His immediate supervisor was another Soviet
source, Frank Coe, to whom he delivered “highly coveted aircraft production
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statistics.”112 Ullman was a resourceful spy, who not only delivered his own information,
but also helped Silvermaster run his network. For example, while he lived with the
Silvermasters he would photograph the copious amounts of documents that were to be
transferred from sources to the USSR.
Another source within the Silvermaster network was George Silverman. He was
part of the communist underground starting in the 1930s and although he did not have a
highly placed job within the U.S. government, his value to the Soviet cause came through
his people skills. Silverman knew Whittaker Chambers through his espionage. Chambers
explained how Silverman’s main job was to keep one of the most important Soviet
sources in the U.S. Government, Harry Dexter White, cooperative with the communist
agenda.113 In addition, Silverman was the Civilian Chief of Analysis and Plans in the
Office of the Assistant Chief of the Army Air Force Air Staff for Material and Service,
where he would provide the KGB with “reports on American aircraft production and
allocation and on training and provisioning of air crews.”114 Despite this connection, he
was still most vital because of his connection to Harry White and Lauchlin Currie.
Harry Dexter White was one of the most important Soviet spies who was not
involved in atomic espionage. Historians Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes describe
White as the “most important member of the Silvermaster network and the most highly
placed asset the Soviets possessed in the American government… as assistant secretary
of the treasury.”115 White was a Lithuanian Jew whose family immigrated to the United
States when he was young. He was a very intelligent and successful man, as he went to
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Stanford and then got his PhD from Harvard. In the 1930s he joined the Treasury and
continued to rise steadily through the ranks. By 1941 he was Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury and by the end of the war he had become the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury. White had a profound impact on the U.S. economic perspective when he and
John Maynard Keynes sculpted the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. By 1946 he had
risen to one of the most important position in the U.S. Government: Director of the
IMF.116
White had an immeasurable impact on the American economic outlook during the
war years. However, while White was working for the U.S. Government, he was
simultaneously providing intelligence to the USSR. White began his contact with the
Soviet Union in the middle of the 1930s when he reported to Whittaker Chambers and his
GRU network. Chambers described his assistance to the cause “as more of a Soviet
sympathizer than a disciplined CPUSA member, someone who cooperated with the party
underground to the extent he wished but didn’t take orders.” 117 This style was
characteristic of White’s service to the Soviet Union. In the 1940s he began reporting to
the KGB through Silvermaster, but maintained this manner of espionage. Majority of
White’s usefulness came with his connections in the government. He not only used his
resources within the government to help pro-communist policies pass, like when he was a
senior adviser to the American delegation at the founding of the United Nations, but he
helped Soviet sources, like “Frank Coe, Harold Glasser, Ludgwig Ullmann, Victor Perlo,
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Sonia Gold, Gregory Silvermaster, George Silverman, Irving Kaplan, William Taylor,
and Solomon Adler,” get positions of influence at government jobs.118
While White provided some valuable information to the Soviet cause, author R.
Bruce Craig suggests that what White passed along never fully subverted U.S. policy.119
Furthermore, White vehemently testified against Elizabeth Bentley after she accused him
of espionage by giving an extremely pro-American speech that subverted her argument to
many people.120 This largely cleared White of Bentley’s accusations in the eyes of the
public. White’s friend and adviser at the end of the war also fought to clear White’s name
in his book Foreign Adventures of an Economist. Ray Mikesell claimed that White did
not fear communism and thus was not afraid to work with communist officials, but that
he never engaged in covert operations.121 It is also a possibility that White was a blind
source for the Soviets; meaning that while he did provide information to the Soviet
Union, he did not realize that he was giving them valuable secrets.122 Despite all of this,
historians Haynes and Klehr still argue that White was a participant in Soviet espionage,
as his name comes up in more than two-dozen KGB cables. Nevertheless, White cut his
contact with the KGB in 1945, after word of Bentley’s defection, and died only days after
defending himself against her accusations in 1948.
Another one of the sources that operated through Gregory Silvermaster was
another high-ranking U.S. official, Lauchlin Currie. Currie was a Harvard graduate who
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began working for the U.S. government in 1934. Currie and White knew each other when
they both worked in the Treasury’s Division of Research and Statistics. By 1943 he was a
“powerful figure in wartime Washington, both as a presidential aide and as an
administrator of an agency.”123 Throughout his rise in power in Washington, Currie held
ties to the communist underground. Whittaker Chambers claims that Currie held ties to
the communists beginning in the 1930s. However, he explains that Currie was much like
White in the way he conducted himself among these associates. He was extremely
cautious and more or less cooperated with the cause by only providing a limited amount
of information. As Whittaker Chambers explained, he “never went the full way.”124
Nevertheless, Currie still delivered important documents to his communist links.
For example, an “August 1943 New York KGB cable reports to Moscow that Currie had
given Silverman a memorandum on a political subject, otherwise unspecified, that was
either from or for the State Department.”125 The FBI, specifically its director Edgar
Hoover, was curious as to where Currie’s allegiances actually laid. He brought the
question to President Truman in 1945, but a deeper investigation did not happen. After
Bentley’s testimony there was a much deeper interest in whether or not Currie was a full
out spy for the Soviet Union. Currie lost his citizenship within the United States as a
result of these speculations, and moved to Colombia with his wife in 1950 as a
consequence.
When analyzing the impact that both Currie and White had in terms of what they
gave over to the Soviets, it is important to also understand the context of the time in
which they were living. Julius Kobyakov, the deputy director of the KGB’s American
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Division during the late 1980s, describes how the significance of what Currie and White
did can be lost if not explained through their circumstances:
I understand that Currie or [Harry Dexter] White, who were branded as
subversives in the McCarthy era and stigmatised again by the VENONA
cables, would hardly be considered heroes by the present day American
historical establishment. But if a professional opinion is called for, as to
whether those people were Soviet agents, my answer is no. It is easy to
badmouth the people who no longer can defend themselves, and to
overlook the fact that they in their own way may have helped the antiHitler coalition to win the bloodiest war in history.126
Currie and White believed that the information they were providing to their ally, the
Soviet Union, would help defeat Hitler’s Nazi regime. Their intentions may not have
been to subvert their own government, but to actually help them work with their political
allies in defeating their opponent. Nevertheless, no matter their true plan, it is still
important to study the influence that these men had in relation to their roles with the U.S.
government.

The Golos-Bentley network was one of the most well developed spy rings within
the U.S. government. If it had not been for Golos’ death and Bentley’s defection, the
network would have probably continued to run smoothly. Nevertheless, their espionage
was still second in importance to the work of those spies working within the atomic
intelligence field. One of the most significant projects that was taken on by Americans
during World War II was the development of an atomic bomb that could cripple whole
cities within an instance. Starting in 1939, scientists from England had been working on
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the possibility of “utilizing the atomic energy of uranium for military purposes.”127 The
report was brought to the United States government in September of 1941, with the
proposal of a joint, but informal partnership in order to create the atomic bomb.128 By the
early 1940s the American effort to procure the bomb first had increased dramatically.
Scientists from Britain came to the United States and collaborated at either the Los
Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico or the Oak Ridge Facility in Tennessee. This urgency
came from the American and British fear that German scientists would develop a similar
bomb before they finished their own. Despite their fear, the Germans were actually fairly
slow in the development of this technology and were incapable of producing an atomic
bomb during wartime Germany.129
While the United States and the British were pushing for the bomb on their own,
the Soviet Union was being slowly informed of their allies’ efforts. Anatolii Gorskii
informed the Soviets of the Maud Committee’s initial report on September 25, 1941.130
As a result of the information that Gorskii reported to the USSR, “the Soviet government
now knew that Britain had decided to build an atomic bomb, that British scientists
estimated that it would take between two and five years to do this, and that Britain had
decided to build a gaseous diffusion separation plant in North America.”131 Despite these
findings, the Soviet Union did not begin to develop their bomb right away. By 1942,
Lavrentiy Beria (Commissar General of State Security in the Soviet Union) had tried to
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push Stalin to put more effort into their atomic project.132 Stalin agreed and in 1943 the
Soviet atomic project was underway. Igor Kurchatov was appointed the head of the
Soviet atomic program on March 10, 1943. David Holloway expertly explains the
controversial beginnings of the Soviet bomb in his book Stalin and the Bomb. He
describes how Stalin received a lot of information before 1943 about how there was no
use in working on a nuclear project because the war would most likely be over before
they could finish. However, despite these warnings, Stalin decided to go through with the
project. As Holloway explains, “the project he started is best understood as a rather small
hedge against future uncertainties.”133
Although the Soviets decided to start their own nuclear program, they had to look
elsewhere for inspiration on how to begin. Kurchatov contacted Gaik Ovakimian, deputy
chief of the foreign department of the NKVD, with his goals for the project. Ovakimian
then passed along this request to some of his agents abroad.134 While there is no doubt
that the Soviets would have completed the building of an atomic bomb on their own time,
the information that intelligence officers abroad provided sped up the process by a couple
of years. Two of the most important agents to work with the USSR were Harry Gold and
scientist Klaus Fuchs.
Harry Gold was born in Switzerland in 1912, but was a brought to the United
States before he was even two years old. Gold was an accomplished spy by the time that
he started working on the atomic project. Gold had been a spy since 1935 when he started
working at the Pennsylvania Sugar Company. Thomas Lessing Black recruited him into
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this industrial espionage by appealing to the needs of the struggling Soviet people.135
However, Gold had no hesitations with joining and immediately agreed by saying that
“the chance to help strengthen the Soviet Union appeared as such a wonderful
opportunity.”136 In addition to his desire to help the Soviet people, he also was inclined to
help the USSR because it was the first state to making anti-semitism illegal.137 (While
this is true, it is also quite ridiculous in retrospect, considering Stalin sent many Jews to
die in the Gulag throughout his tenure in office.)
Gold collected and copied blueprints from the Sugar Company throughout his
first couple of years engaging in espionage. However, this type of system could not hold
up. The amount of information that Gold was bringing in was too much for him and
Black to copy and get back to the Soviets. Thankfully, the two were able to use the
resources provided by AMTORG (the Soviet spy ring that doubled as an American
trading company) and their intake increased. 138 The amount of data that Gold was
bringing in thoroughly impressed his Soviet handlers. Over time Gold would continue to
rise in stature when working with Russian intelligence. Gold worked in industrial
espionage for 9 years, but became so disillusioned with the whole process that he almost
decided to cut ties with the work. He explains the tiresome aspects of his life in this
excerpt:
[T]he planning for a meeting with a Soviet agent; the careful preparations
for obtaining data from Penn Sugar, the writing of technical reports and
the filching of blueprints for spying (and then returning them); the
meeting[s]… in New York or Cincinnati or Rochester or Buffalo… the
difficulties I had raising money for all these trips; the cajoling of
135

Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, 38/39.
Sibley, 111.
137
Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, 39. Sibley, 112.
138
Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, 41.
136

37

Brothman…and the outright blackmailing of Ben Smilg [the Dayton
aircraft engineer who refused to deal with Gold]… [and] the many lies I
had to tell at home.139
Furthermore, Gold only accepted $100 per month for all of what he did for the Soviets.
This amount was intended to cover all his travel and food expenses, but was obviously
not nearly enough. Nevertheless, Gold stuck with it because of his intense devotion to the
cause. By 1942 Gold reported to Semyon Semonov and became thoroughly engaged once
again because of the respect that he had for his new handler.
A year after Gold met Semonov he would be granted an even more important role
in his work with Soviet intelligence. Semonov approached him with the idea in early
January of 1944 and spoke to him in very cautious language. An excerpt from Harry
Gold’s biography, The Invisible Harry Gold by Allen M. Hornblum, describes the
interaction between Semonov and Gold: “Sam [Semonov] then asked an unusual
question: Did Harry “wish to accept the assignment?” In the past, Harry “had always
been told what to do” and when to do it. And there was another thing: Sam said the
assignment would be “extremely dangerous.”140 Semonov then introduced Gold to the
idea of becoming the courier for Klaus Fuchs, a scientist working on creating one of the
world’s most dangerous weapons. Gold accepted without hesitation.141
Klaus Fuchs was possibly the most important spy for the Soviet Union. Fuchs
grew up in Germany throughout the early part of the twentieth century. Fuchs, like his
father, was an outspoken communist and opponent of Nazism. He believed that “fascism
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was the real enemy, and communism a moral parable of hope in an age of anxiety.”142As
political hostility began to grow in Germany, Fuchs got increasingly concerned about his
safety. By 1933 he had left Germany because of these concerns. Eventually he made it to
the University of Bristol where he worked towards getting his PhD in physics in 1936.
Fuchs applied for naturalization in 1939, but when war broke out between England and
Germany, he was a labeled as an “enemy alien.”143 He spent six months in jail until the
confusion was finally resolved. In 1941 he finally received his full British citizenship.144
1941 was a big year for Fuchs, as he joined the British atomic project during that
year as well. Fuchs was typically very quiet about his political affiliation when he spoke
with his scientific colleagues, but that did not stop him from continuing his work for the
communist cause. He approached Jürgen Kuczynski (an old friend and GRU agent) to get
him involved in some type of espionage. Kuczynski gave Fuchs his sister’s contact
information and he met Ruth in 1942. Fuchs told her that he “would give her ‘classified
and confidential… written data concerning atomic energy research.”145 Despite his clear
willingness to commit espionage for the Soviets, he still took the British oath that
committed him to the Official Secrets Act, which pledged him to keeping the secrets of
the British government and its national security. He labeled this ability to balance both
the British and the Soviets as a “controlled schizophrenia.”146 Nevertheless, the fact that
he took the oath of silence with the British allowed him to be transferred to the Los
Alamos facility in America very easily.
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It was when Fuchs was transferred to the American project that Harry Gold came
into contact with him. Fuchs was now to be reporting to the KGB instead of the GRU.
Fuchs’ new handler, Pavel Fitin, sent a letter that described Fuchs situation with the GRU
and how to make contact with him once he reached America. Gold met with Fuchs for
the first time in a China Town restaurant where they shared basic information. After the
dinner, the two went on a lengthy walk in which they laid out how their future meetings
would go and Fuchs gave Gold a basic understanding of the Manhattan Project.147 Gold
was extremely impressed with Fuchs and his professionalism (especially compared to his
old source, Abraham Brothman) and the two would have a very successful relationship
together.
When Fuchs first came to America with the fourteen other British scientists, he
was sent to work on gaseous diffusion as an employee at the Kellex Corporation. During
this time Fuchs gave Gold thirteen significant scientific papers that outlined “the
explosive properties of fissionable material and details about the plans for the Oak Ridge
facility.”148 The Fuchs-Gold-Semonov network performed efficiently until 1944 when
Semonov had to be sent back to the USSR. Growing surveillance put him at risk of
revealing the whole program, so Anatoli Antonovich Yakovlev (Yatskov) replaced him
that year. Gold was less than impressed with Semonov’s replacement, but he would
nonetheless be his contact for the next two years.149
Fuchs knew about almost every part of the atomic plants in America. Manson
Benedict of Kellex believed that if Fuchs were to speak to the Soviets, that they could
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complete their building of an atomic bomb years before they otherwise would have.150
Fuchs reported on a myriad of topics that inevitably did speed up the process. For
example, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr list him as turning over…
[I]nformation about the organization of the US atomic project and work on
uranium separation, both gaseous diffusion and an alternative method,
electromagnetic separation, developed at the University of California
Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Other KGB messages report that Fuchs
delivered information on the progress of the project and more technical
details about gaseous diffusion.151
Fuchs had a profound impact on the Soviet’s progress in their atomic research. Alexander
Feklisov believes he was by far the most important spy within the Manhattan Project and
that the Soviet Union was able to create their three bombs as replicas of the American
models because of the information he turned over.152 He worked at Los Alamos until the
British and American atomic bomb projects parted ways once again in 1946. Fuchs spied
until testimony by Elizabeth Bentley and Igor Gouzenko (Soviet spy within Canada who
defected) implicated him in espionage. Venona decryptions that the U.S. turned over to
the British Security Service, MI5, further compromised his position. In 1950 Fuchs
confessed to acts of espionage and served nine years in prison as a result. He turned in his
courier, Harry Gold, during the process. Gold served sixteen of his thirty-year sentence
after he confessed to espionage.153 Despite that they ended up getting caught, Fuchs and
Gold were two of the most important Soviet agents during the race for the atomic bomb.
While Fuchs and Gold provided some of the most notable secrets back to the
Soviet Union during the war, the USSR had many other agents working for them at the
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same time. Another significant network within the Manhattan project was that of
Theodore Hall, Saville Sax, Lona and Morris Cohen. Hall was recruited to work at Los
Alamos only a year after he graduated from Harvard in 1944. Hall confided in one of his
close friends from Harvard, Saville Sax, on a break during his first year working on the
Manhattan Project that he believed the Soviet Union deserved to know the secrets of the
program.154 Hall wrote about his decision to give the USSR secrets of the bomb in a letter
from 1995, just after he had been publically suspected of espionage. He writes:
My decision about contacting the Soviets was a gradual one, and it was
entirely my own. It was entirely voluntary, not influenced by any other
individual or by any organization such as the Communist Party or the
Young Communist League. I was never “recruited” by anyone…. My
political views had been shaped by the economic depression of the 1930s.
With the New Deal Roosevelt had tried to restore prosperity, but this was
only partly successful and it was not until the war that the depression
really ended. What would happen when the war was over? …But it
seemed to me that an American monopoly [over atomic bomb
intelligence] was dangerous and should be prevented.155
Hall wrote this letter with hindsight and the knowledge of what was to come with the
Cold War in the years that followed World War Two. At the time, he believed that an
exchange of nuclear knowledge would level the playing field once the Allies had won the
war. Unfortunately, he was a bit off in his predictions. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union would access atomic weaponry by the end of the 1950s, which instead of
balancing out the playing field made the competition between the two super powers
grow. The ideological struggle between the two countries further complicated this
relationship and the bomb gave them lobbying power against one another.
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Nevertheless, Hall joined the espionage network in 1944 working under Sergey
Kurnakov. Kurnakov was a KGB agent who double as a writer for the CPUSA
newspaper, the Daily Worker.156 Kurnakov proceeded with a bit of caution during his
first meeting with Hall. While it was not unheard of, it was much more unlikely for a
source to approach the KGB about providing them secrets. However, during their first
meeting Hall brought Kurnakov a packet of documents that outlined “the progress of the
research, and the roles of the chief scientists working on the bomb” that calmed many of
Kurnakov’s fears.157
Hall had only been on his two-week furlough from Los Alamos when he had met
Kurnakov. Since there was not a sufficient amount of time for Hall to make contact with
an official KGB courier, the network decided to use his old friend, Sax, as his primary
messenger. Hall was given the cover name Mlad or Youngster, while Sax was referred to
Star or Oldster; each of their names can be found in about eight KGB cables that were
decoded during the Venona Projects.158 When Hall worked at Los Alamos he was tasked
with developing ways to use X-Rays to stimulate implosion in the atomic bomb.159
Although he was not as important as the other Soviet source, Klaus Fuchs, he still passed
along very valuable information to his handlers. For example, “Hall delivered reports on
the implosion detonation system for the plutonium bomb and on the methods the
Manhattan Project had developed to separate the needed uranium U-235 from the
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unneeded U-238.”160 Hall continued to work at Los Alamos and deliver secrets to the
USSR until the war ended.
Hall’s legacy is very convoluted. He maintained that he was never involved in
espionage when he was first suspected in the 1950s. Hall and Sax’s names appeared in a
deciphered KGB cable that brought their allegiance into doubt, but the two remained
steadfast in their defense.161 When the Venona cables became public knowledge in 1995,
Hall essentially admitted his guilt (in the letter quoted above). Hall moved to England in
1962 and worked on cancer research for the remainder of his life until he passed away in
1999.162
During Theodore Hall’s tenure working for Soviet espionage, Saville Sax did not
always operate as his courier. Lona Cohen sometimes stepped in and collected documents
from Hall. Lona and her husband Morris both worked covertly for the Soviet intelligence
networks. Morris joined the American communist movement in 1935 at the age of
twenty-five. Shortly after joining he went to Spain with a group of young American
communists and fought for the Communist headed International Brigades. 163 Morris
clearly had a strong ideological tie towards communism, which was exhibited when he
returned from abroad and began to work with the KGB through Semyon Semonov.164
Morris was primarily a courier for Semonov, although he did recommend that his
wife Lona also be brought into the service. During their early years of service the two
delivered details on aircraft machine guns before they knew of the atomic bomb.165 Lona
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also functioned as Theodore Hall’s courier at certain times during 1945 in New
Mexico.166 One of the documents that Lona delivered from Hall is said to be one of the
“first crude outlines of the atomic bomb.”167 The Cohens were a valuable asset to Soviet
intelligence, but were forced to flee the United States in 1950 after Elizabeth Bentley’s
defection. The two functioned as spies within England, posing as bookstore owners but
actually providing the Soviet Union with secrets on the British Navy.168 The spy ring was
cracked open in 1961 and the Cohens went to prison. However, what followed their arrest
shows just how important they were to the Soviet Union. The USSR fought for their
release and even traded the imprisonment of a British businessman for them to be
freed.169
While the Cohen’s were a vital cog in the Soviet Union’s espionage machine, one
of the most important networks that functioned during World War II was that of the
Rosenberg’s. The Rosenberg network was not only one of the largest Soviet rings, but it
has also become one of the most notorious. The Rosenberg’s were convicted of spying on
the United States and their trial became a national phenomenon that ended with their
executions. Their network consisted of a myriad of agents within the U.S. government:
Joel Barr, William Perl, Alfred Sarant, Morton Sobell, David Greenglass, and a sixth
unknown; Michael and Ann Sidorovich worked as their couriers; Vivian Glassman, Ruth
Greenglass, and Ethel Rosenberg provided assistance, if needed.170
The network originated with Julius Rosenberg during the 1930s. Julius attended
the City College of New York in the late 1930s, where he joined the Young Communist
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League. It was through these organizations that Julius was able to meet many of the
people who would later function within his spy ring. After his graduation from CCNY in
1940 he started to work at the “War Department’s Signal Supply Office,” where he met
and became close with Alfred Sarant and Joel Barr.171 Rosenberg’s other friends from the
YCL were in similar positions across the nation. Rosenberg “quickly realized that their
positions offered them access to America’s advanced radio, radar, sonar, and other
military electronics technology and decided to seek out Soviet intelligence to deliver
these secrets to the USSR.”172
Finding a Soviet agent was a harder task than Rosenberg believed it would be.
However, he was looking during the early 1940s, which was right after Stalin’s purge of
his intelligence officers. Stalin’s paranoia had severely dismantled his networks abroad,
but thankfully for Rosenberg, Jacob Golos had refused to return to the Soviet Union and
remained an active agent. Rosenberg used his contacts within the Communist party,
specifically Bernard Schuster, to finally reach out to Golos in 1942, where he was picked
up as a source and given the codename Antennae, which would later change to Liberal.173
During the early years of the 1940s, the Rosenberg network’s handlers changed a
few times as a consequence of Stalin’s purges. For example, in 1942 Vasiliy Zarubin
came over from the Soviet Union and tried to re-organize the espionage networks
functioning during the war. His re-organization eventually led to Jacob Golos (and then
Elizabeth Bentley after his death) having to hand over their leadership of the Rosenberg
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Network. The two resisted, but by 1944 Semyon Semonov had control of the Rosenberg
spy ring.174
Julius Rosenberg’s espionage career was notable for the secrets that he passed
over to the Soviets; however, the majority of Rosenberg’s value to the USSR actually
came from his work in technical intelligence. 175 Rosenberg collected documents on
“advanced radio, radar, sonar, and other military electronics technology” that he thought
could be useful for the Soviet cause. 176 Semonov’s initial report on the Rosenberg
network explains how the data that the workers were turning in while they worked under
Golos was of low quality and was barely useful. However, he further explains that once
Golos relinquished the group and he took over, the agents began to “mature[d] and
obtain[ed] a number of highly valuable materials.”177 Semonov described Rosenberg as
an enthusiastic recruit, who provided the Soviet Union with copious amounts of
intelligence over the years.178 For example, after Rosenberg was let go from the Army
Signal Corps in 1944 (for suspicions of being a communist), he provided details on the
proximity fuse, a new and advanced product from the United States that allowed bombs
or other types of warheads to explode when they got close enough to their target.179
Rosenberg actually brought in a replicated version of the proximity fuse (a very risky
choice), which shows how untrained he had been before Semonov took over his spy ring.
Nevertheless, Rosenberg was such a valuable asset to the Soviets not only for
what he physically delivered to them, but because of whom he managed. One of
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Rosenberg’s most useful assets was actually his wife, Ethel. The two met when they were
in high school and eventually got married in 1939 and had two boys.180 However, the two
had met much earlier, in 1932, where they got to know each other and developed their
communist sympathies. Ethel was a very helpful support system to Julius during his years
working in Soviet espionage and was actually the older sister of one of Julius’ main
sources, David Greenglass.181
David was seven years younger than his sister, which greatly influenced why his
life took the path that it did. When David was twelve, Ethel met Julius and the two
became very adamant that David join the communist cause. David became a passionate
communist, which can be shown from the letter between him and his wife, Ruth in the
1940s. Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton’s book The Rosenberg File includes many of the
letters that were exchanged between the couple, one of which explains David’s motive
for handing over information to the Soviets:
Darling, I love you and no matter what happens in America politically. In
the end it will be Europe and a large part of Asia that will turn Socialist
and the American end of the world will of necessity follow in the same
course. So, dear, we still look forward to a Socialist America and we shall
have that world in our time.182
Greenglass’s beliefs proved very beneficial for the Rosenbergs, considering Greenglass
would work for the Army at the Los Alamos nuclear plant starting in 1944.183 When
Julius realized that David was working on this secret project he enlisted the help of
David’s wife, Ruth, to convince him to hand over secrets on the bomb. At first, David
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was reluctant to turn over any information, but the Rosenbergs tried to appeal to him by
saying that the Russians were their allies and deserved to know this information.184 This
obviously struck a cord with David and he began to furnish them with secrets soon after.
David not only provided Julius with valuable facts about the American atomic bomb, but
he told him about the scientists working on the project, and the dynamics of their work
place.185 At one point, Greenglass even met with Harry Gold and provided him with
“sketches of experiments… descriptive material regarding them… possible recruits for
espionage.”186 Greenglass received a monetary reward for the information he reported to
Gold, but it was yet to be the most crucial piece of intelligence that he passed over.
Greenglass confessed to turning over a detailed drawing and explanation of the same
atomic bomb that was to be dropped on Hiroshima later that year.187
Greenglass continued to provide information to the Rosenbergs until 1949.
However, by this time the relationship between the two couples had been somewhat
strained.188 Greenglass did not heed his brother-in-laws warnings about the FBI, which
would prove a big mistake. In June of 1950 Greenglass was arrested under suspicion of
espionage.189 David’s wife, Ruth, was also arrested for her involvement (albeit limited) in
spying activities. Harry Gold testified against both the Rosenbergs and Greenglasses and
described the times that he had met with them. David not only added to Gold’s testimony
against the Rosenbergs, but also gave false testimony against his sister, Ethel, instead of
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the implicating his wife in the crime.190 However, the entire Rosenberg network did not
go down when this testimony came out. There were still four other major players within
the Rosenberg ring.
Alfred Sarant met Julius Rosenberg in 1940 when they were both working at the
Army Signal Corps. While Rosenberg was let go because of his affiliation with
communism, Sarant was fired because of his disruptive union work.191 Sarant then got a
job at Western Electric working with radar. During this time he was living with his good
friend and fellow technician and Soviet spy, Joel Barr. Unlike Sarant, Barr had been a
classmate of Julius’ at the City College of New York. Barr met Sarant while working at
Western Electric and the two became inseparable as a result. The KGB even
acknowledged them as a packaged deal and their Soviet handler, Feklisov, claimed them
to be two of the most worthwhile spies within the Rosenberg apparatus.192 Sarant and
Barr carried out their espionage in a unique way: photographs. They had a dark room in
their apartment that they used to develop film and hand off to either the Rosenbergs or
Harry Gold.193 Sarant was able to give the Soviets “‘17 authentic drawings’ of Bell’s
APQ-7, an airborne radar, in 1944” by taking photographs of them.194
After the war ended both Barr and Sarant left their jobs at Western Electric and
tried to open an engineering firm together. Unfortunately, the firm failed and the two
friends went their separate ways. When Harry Gold and David Greenglass confessed Barr
was living in Paris and he disappeared soon after he learned of their testimony. Sarant
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was less lucky. At the time of their confessions he was still living in the United States and
was contacted by the government that he was under investigation and should halt all
travel plans. Sarant, obviously understanding the outcome if he stayed in America, fled
the United States for Mexico and was never seen again. Both Barr and Sarant left without
even telling their families.195 While the Rosenbergs remained steadfast in their innocence,
the fact that their associates fled at the mention of a trial did not help their cause.
Although Barr and Sarant were able to escape unscathed from betraying the
United States, another associate of theirs was not so lucky. Morton Sobell was a Russianborn immigrant to the United States and was a college friend of Julius Rosenberg. He
shared Rosenberg’s feelings towards communism and began to report to him after he left
college. Sobell worked as an electrical engineer at “an instrument company in New York
City, where he had access to secret data.”196 The company was Reeves Electronic and he
reported on “U.S. government contracts for secret military research.”197 Harvey Klehr
and John Earl Haynes explain how the fact that Sobell was able to work with such
sensitive material shows just how negligent the U.S. government was with
counterespionage as this point in history:
It is another illustration of the laxness of American internal security
practices in the 1940s that Sobell, whom Naval Intelligence had marked as
a supporter of the American Peace Mobilization, who had worked as a
counselor at a Communist youth camp, and whose admiration for Stalin
was hardly camouflaged, received a security clearance to work on
American defense contracts as late as 1949.198
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Therefore, despite all these red flags, the electronic company still chose to hire Sobell.
However, when Sobell got word of Gold’s testimony he picked up and left for Mexico
City with his entire family in tow. Unluckily for him, Mexican officials brought him into
custody in August of 1950. Sobell was put on trial for his espionage activities and was
sentenced to thirty years behind bars (he only served nineteen). In 2001 Sobell released
an autobiography that claimed his innocence, but seven years later revised his statement
and admitted his, as well as the Rosenbergs, guilt.199
Ironically, one of Soviet intelligence’s highest generals did not believe that the
Rosenberg network was as significant as the American government made it out to be.
Pavel Sudoplatov claims that he was relatively unalarmed when he heard of their arrests
because they had no significant role in atomic intelligence.200 Sudoplatov’s opinion is
important to be considered, but it is also valuable to understand when and why he was
writing these thoughts. Sudoplatov’s autobiography Special Tasks was released in the
1990s, many years after he was involved in Soviet affairs. He was the head of
“Department S” during the 1940s, which was responsible for operating atomic
intelligence efforts abroad.201
Despite Sudoplatov’s “inside look” into the secret world of Soviet intelligence
networks, many of his claims have been disputed. Sudoplatov claimed that American
atomic scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard all
committed acts of espionage, which have been proven to be false. 202 Furthermore,
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Sudoplatov recounted his experiences nearly fifty years after they occurred and provided
little to no physical evidence for his claims. Nevertheless, it is important to understand
the perspective of actors such as Sudoplatov because they give us insight into larger
aspects of the conflict. For example, Sudoplatov’s exaggerated retelling of the past tells
us the type of legacy that he hoped to leave behind of the now defunct Soviet Union.
Sudoplatov’s goal was to show the power of the country that he dedicated his life to, but
that eventually crumbled to pieces. This is important when considering the way that the
American and Soviet tensions heightened when the fighting stopped in Europe and in
Asia.
Nonetheless, what the Soviet spies provided to the USSR was of great
significance during World War II. While the Soviet Union would have eventually created
an atomic bomb on their own, their access to American intelligence allowed them to have
this dangerous weapon only a few years after the war ended. This fact is extremely
important. Those few years were extremely crucial as they gave both the United States
and the Soviet Union an object of leverage against each other, thus increasing the friction
between the two countries at the outset of the Cold War.
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Chapter 3: Cold War Spies
The end of World War II allowed America to return to the normalcy of life before
the bloody conflict. However, while the German and Japanese threats were gone, the
United States had a new enemy. The Soviet Union and the United States had been allies
throughout the war, yet when the conflict ended their relationship turned very tense. Part
of this tension stemmed from the leaders of those countries. While Franklin Delano
Roosevelt had a very amicable relationship with his counterpart, Joseph Stalin, his life
did not last long enough to see the end of the war. FDR passed away in April of 1945,
leaving his smart, but inexperienced Vice-President Harry Truman in charge. Only days
after Roosevelt passed away, Truman was told of the existence of the Manhattan Project.
This unfortunately put Truman in a very difficult spot. Not only would he have to control
the domestic transition into a stable post-war world, but he would also need to decide
whether or not to use this horrible weapon to end the war in the Pacific.
Post-World War II tensions only intensified as the Allies attempted to divide up
the now defunct governments and their territories in Europe. This led to obvious conflicts
between Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union, as the former two were very much against
the spread of communism into new territories. Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt gathered
for the Yalta Conference in February 1945, in which they discussed the breakdown of the
European territories. Stalin had specific interests in the territories of Eastern Europe, but
the Big Three agreed to allow for free elections in all of these new states. Unfortunately,
Stalin did not follow through with his promises and within months of the agreement,
Socialist Republic’s were set up in all the states bordering the USSR. Almost a year later,
Winston Churchill expressed his discontent with the Soviet Union’s actions in his famous
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“Iron Curtain” speech. The speech outlined the American and the British government’s
intolerance towards the Soviet Union’s unlawful spread of power across Europe.203 This
increased tension between the Soviet Union and the West lasted up until the collapse of
the Soviet government in 1991.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was further
strained during the post-war period because of the defections of Soviet spies to the
American and Canadian governments. The defections of Elizabeth Bentley and Igor
Gouzenko brought attention of the Soviet threat to North America in the second half of
the 1940s. These defections increased the friction between the two countries and as a
result of these defections, the American government had to rethink its counterespionage
network, while the Soviet Union had to reconfigure its now defunct intelligence system.
Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA)
were established only a few years after the end of World War II to increase America’s
ability to prevent breaches in intelligence. While the United States was creating new
counterintelligence structures, Soviet intelligence was trying to rebuild their spy
networks.

Spying has been a constant of international relations, but during the Cold War
there was a significant shift in the reasons that people decided to spy. Right before and
during World War II many of the Soviet spies passed secrets because their ideologies
aligned better with the communist regime. The United States had just suffered a massive
depression during the 1930s and was then propelled into another World War; thus
203
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causing many people to question if democracy was the correct form of government.
However, after World War II many Americans were confident in their leadership. This
led many of those who spied during the Cold War to spy for monetary reasons rather than
for ideology. Especially, considering the fact that by the 1960s many people believe that
the Soviet Union was not going to withstand the test of time.204 Furthermore, a leaked
1956 speech to the Communist Party by Soviet leader, Nikita Krushchev, outlined all the
ways in which he believed Stalin had failed. The speech was named the “Secret Speech”
because all press was excluded from attending the event so that Krushchev could speak
freely. Nevertheless, the speech leaked very quickly and the world became aware of
Stalin’s anti-Semitism and his purges, which further dismantled the already disintegrating
Communist Party of America.205 The motive for many of the Cold War spies shifted
away from ideology and many spies now either participated because of their own
personal crises or because of the monetary reward that they could receive. The espionage
targeted almost every single U.S. defense agency, except for the Coast Guard.206 These
spies handed over information that “could have shifted the balance in a war with the
Soviet Union.”207 The espionage that occurred during the Cold War gave the Soviet
Union some crucial information that allowed them to manage the U.S. threat.

Two of the first Soviet spies after World War II did not actually participate in
covert networks because of monetary reasons. These two were some of the last spies who
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opted for espionage because of their ideological views. Bernon F. Mitchell was from San
Francisco and studied statistics at the California Institute of Technology until he joined
the Navy.208 Mitchell met the Georgia native, William H. Martin, while he was in the
Navy in 1950. The two continued to work together when they got jobs at the National
Security Agency as mathematicians in 1957.209 The two men decided to defect to the
Soviet Union in 1960 because of their anger towards the United States. The American
Navy had been sending planes into Soviet airspace and causing them to get shot down,
which greatly disturbed the pair.210 The two started to think that maybe their beliefs
aligned better with those of the Soviet Union, as they had both been unreligious as
well.211 It was then that the two decided to defect.
Martin went to Urbana University in Ohio where he sought out communists to
help him locate someone to provide information to.212 Shortly after this, the two escaped
during their vacation from work to the Soviet Union. They not only left behind a note that
described their motive, but they held a press conference in Moscow, in which they fielded
questions.213 The two explained more of their grievances with the United States, like the
fact that they did not respect the privacy of their allies and that women were actually
treated better in the Soviet Union because they were given more opportunities for
education, and thus would make better mates.214 Unfortunately for Mitchell and Martin,
they got their opinions of the Soviet Union from propaganda magazines like Soviet Life
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and USSR.215 Soon after they settled into their new lives in Russia, they realized that the
magazines had fooled them.216 Martin even tried to return to the United States, but was
obviously denied entry into the country.217 Martin died in Mexico at the young age of 56,
while Mitchell remained in the Soviet Union until he passed away at 72 in 2001.218
Despite the fact that the two men regretted their crime, they were still never to be
welcome back into the United States. The two men had provided a “gold mine of
cryptographic information” to the Soviet Union, as well as slandered the United States.219
The United States did what it could to recover from their defection and defamation by
labeling them as ‘sexual deviants’, but unfortunately the damage had been done. They
were the worst security breach since Fuchs, and President Truman even said that he
thought they should be shot.220
Although Mitchell and Martin provided important information to the Soviet
Union, there were also other spies that provided a lot of crucial information from within
the American National Security Agency. Jack Dunlap was a decorated Army Sergeant
before he joined the NSA in 1958. Working for the government does not pay well and
Dunlap was struggling to support his family on $100 per month salary.221 Dunlap reached
out to Soviet handlers and began to hand over information in 1960. Dunlap was very
flashy with his new source of wealth. He bought both Jaguars and Cadillacs and spent his
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time as a “womanizing, beer-drinking ‘family man’ with a wife and five children.”222 He
also spent time with his mistresses and at the yacht club, and while everyone else seemed
to notice his new affluence, his employer remained unaware.223 Overall, Dunlap was a
very effective spy. James Bamford in The Puzzle Palace describes all the information that
he gave over to the Soviets from the NSA during a three-year period and the
consequences that this had:
The damage to America’s SIGINT and COMSEC operations during those
years cannot even be estimated, for no one except his KGB handlers will
ever know exactly which documents were sold. One Pentagon official
later commented that Dunlap’s treason was “thirty to forty times as serious
as the Mitchell and Martin defections.”224
While Dunlap provided a myriad of information over to the Soviet Union, his work with
espionage led him to his eventual demise. The NSA began to take precautions against
spies within their agency and administered polygraph tests to all their employees.
Dunlap’s examiner noted some concerns with his initial test and told him that he should
come in to retake the test on the following Monday. Dunlap was extremely paranoid and
had already tried to take his life before he was under suspicion, so this new development
only intensified his efforts. Dunlap was successful and on July 23, 1963 he died from
carbon monoxide poisoning.225 It was after his death that the FBI learned of his spying
efforts.
The year that the FBI learned of Dunlap’s treachery was the same year that they
unearthed another spy. John Butenko worked for the International Electronic Company,
which was collaborating with the United States Air Force to “produce a command and
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control system for the Strategic Air Command.”226 At this post he was given access to
many top-secret documents that he transferred over to the KGB between April and
October 1963. Butenko had been meeting with Soviet national and AMTORG employee,
Igor Ivanov, as well as employees from the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, Gleb A.
Pavlov, Yuri A. Romashin and Vladimir I. Olenev.227 The FBI observed these meetings
and eventually convicted Butenko and Ivanov of spying against the United States.228
Butenko was sentenced to a thirty-year sentence for his transgressions against the United
States.229
Although the FBI was catching various spies at the beginning of the Cold War,
that did not stop many more agents from continuing their efforts. For example,
Christopher J. Boyce and his childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, spied for the Soviet
Union during 1975 and 1976. Boyce’s father had worked in the FBI when he was a child
and helped him procure a job working for TRW Inc. His position put him in close contact
with the communications between the company and the CIA, which he realized he could
utilize for his own benefit.230 Lee acted as a courier for Boyce and the two delivered
information on satellite systems and submarine routes to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City.231 The two received $77,000 for their spying, which they claimed they did because
Boyce had become disillusioned with the United States government. When asked about

226

“United States of America v. John William Butenko and Igor A. Ivanov,” US Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, date accessed February 20, 2015,
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/384/554/392676/.
227
“United States of America v. John William Butenko and Igor A. Ivanov.”
228
“United States of America v. John William Butenko and Igor A. Ivanov.”
229
Sibley, 223.
230
Sibley, 227.
231
Sibley, 227; Chuck Squatriglia, “US Spy Freed After 25 Years in Prison: Christopher Boyce
Sold Secrets to Soviets,” Last modified March 15, 2003, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/US-spy-freed-after-25-years-in-prison-2662800.php.

60

why he decided to spy, Boyce explained that a lot of it had to do with his childhood. He
described how growing up through Kennedy’s assassination, the race riots, the Vietnam
War (and seeing the U.S. use napalm) and then the Richard Nixon scandal, made him
become very angry at the American government.232 He even said that he thought that he
could “use the KGB to bash the CIA.”233 However, he does acknowledge that his motive
was different from spies of the past. While World War II spies did so because they agreed
with Soviet ideology, he explains, “Nobody these days is spying to help the Soviet Union
or to further their ideology because their ideology is pretty much bankrupt.”234 He spied
because he was frustrated with the American government, especially with how the United
States conducted foreign affairs (specifically with Australia).235 Nevertheless, he also
acknowledges that with hindsight, he understands that he committed treason and was
wrongful in doing so.236
However, Boyce and Lee’s espionage did not last very long. Lee had a drug
problem that not only made him act irrationally, but made him an annoyance to his Soviet
handlers. In an attempt to contact his handlers, Lee tried to deliver a message to the
Soviets at their Embassy in Mexico City by throwing a note over their fence, which got
him arrested by the local police.237 He was mistakenly accused of murdering a Mexican
police officer, but during the interrogation he confessed to his actual crime of espionage
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against the United States.238 In his confession he implicated his friend Boyce and the two
were arrested by the United States government soon after.239 Lee was sentenced to life in
prison, while Boyce only received forty years.240 However, Boyce eventually procured
twenty-eight more years to his sentence after he escaped from his prison and spent two
years robbing banks in the north western United States.241
Many Cold War spies were not only motivated by their problems with U.S.
policy, but also because of their own selfish greed. John Anthony Walker, Jr.’s claimed
that his motive for handing over secrets to the Soviet Union went beyond just his need for
money. In his memoir My Life as a Spy he explained how “he operated from a ‘Don
Quixote-like’ attitude and wanted to end the Cold War by sharing America’s plans with
the Soviet Union. In doing so, he said, the Soviets would see that the United States had
no intention of going to war.” 242 This interpretation may have been a self-serving
realization, as selling out your own country for money is a lot less appealing than selling
out your country in an attempt to prevent World War III. Despite what his reasoning may
have been for providing “top cryptographic secrets” to his Soviet handlers, he was
guilty.243
Walker is a very interesting case of Soviet espionage because while he was retired
he was able to continue his spying. In the beginning of his career he worked as a U.S.
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Navy Warrant Officer and communications specialist from 1967 to 1985.244 During that
time he sold over one million documents worth of Naval dispatches to the Soviet Union.
Walker enlisted his son, his brother and his good friend into his network so that he could
continue to spy after he retired. The FBI has said that what Walker and his group
provided to the USSR “could have been devastating to the U.S. had the nation gone to
war with the Soviets.”245 This realization called his motive into question. While he
claimed that he spied for the Soviets so that he could prevent war, it is clear that the
information he provided could have been used by the Soviet Union to be successful in
battle against the U.S. Therefore, his true motive could be clouded by his hopes to not
sound like a greedy man.
Nevertheless, there were still many spies that provided information to the Soviets
because of the monetary reward. Many people working for government agencies such as
the NSA held low paying jobs that made living in places like Washington, D.C. and New
York City difficult. Ronald William Pelton of the NSA is a good example. Pelton had
worked as a communications specialist at the NSA, but began to sell secrets to the Soviet
Embassy in D.C. after he retired.246 Pelton sold secrets from 1980 through 1985 until he
was caught and sentenced to serve life in prison for his spying.247
Many people initially became spies because of the quick money that they could
receive, yet claimed that it was not their greed that made them do it. For example, Earl
Pitts claimed that he was “still a Patriot” even though he spied.248 He claimed that saying
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that he spied for greed was too simple a reason. He explained that he did it because of a
“rigorous childhood that gave him a streak of perfectionism and an enduring fear of
failure” that he endured from his strict upbringing in Missouri.249 Pitts began to work for
the FBI in New York City, but like many other government employees, was unable to
afford the high cost of living on such a small paycheck.250 At one point he had to ask his
father to borrow money, which he said was one of the most humiliating moments of his
life.251 It was because of these money issues and his fear of humiliation that he began to
spy for the KGB. 252 He enjoyed his work for some time, but eventually became
frustrated. While he handed over “lists of Russian diplomats whom the FBI suspected of
spying for the Soviets…” he also “faked other documents,” like papers that he copied
directly from Newsweek.253 Pitts worked as a spy from 1987 until 1992 when he became
dormant. Over that time he earned himself an extra $224,000 from the Soviet Union.254
However, in 1995 the FBI suspected him of previous espionage and set him up in a sting
operation. It was through this sting that Pitts was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his
crimes.255
Aldrich Ames is another example of a Soviet spy who was purely motivated by
money. Ames started working at the CIA in the 1960s as a case officer that specialized in
Russian affairs.256 His time working at the CIA was characterized by alcoholism, adultery
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and unproductivity.257 Not only that, but Ames had a track record of being a careless
agent and on one occasion he even left a briefcase full of classified documents on a
train.258 Fortunately, the briefcase was recovered; however, Ames continued to have
trouble abiding by the rules of the CIA. In the early 1980s he started a relationship with
one of his foreign assets, which was against the CIA’s code of conduct.259 This eventually
led to a messy divorce with his first wife, in which he lost a lot of money. As has been
examined with the spies who were already mentioned, surviving on a government
paycheck in an expensive city is not the easiest task to complete. It was because of this
situation that Ames concocted a plot to trick the Soviets.
Ames had been head of the counterintelligence branch of the CIA’s Soviet
division starting in September of 1983. 260 This position gave Ames access to vital
information that would prove very useful to the Soviet Union, specifically details on who
and where the United States spies were that were operating abroad.261 Ames’ access to
this information paired with his extreme debt created his formula for espionage. He
believed that he could sell the KGB “useless information” that he could pass as valuable
and receive a big pay out for it.262 Ames was seemingly correct, as he received $50,000
after he committed his first act of espionage.263
However, as Ames continued to work within the CIA, he realized that his delivery
of this information could turn into something more. Not only had he already betrayed his
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country (a crime for which he would have to pay), but he also left himself vulnerable to
being found out. With American spies abroad in the Soviet Union, he was defenseless if
they heard that he had provided information to the Soviets. These circumstances led
Ames to decide to fully commit to espionage and turn in “over six pounds of hundreds of
pages of documents.”264 Ames told the Soviets the names of the secret American agents
that were working in their government, which in turn led to many of their deaths.265
Ames has talked about this decision in the book Betrayal by Tim Weiner, David
Johnston, and Neil A. Lewis by saying “in a sense, I was delivering myself along with
them. I was saying: Over to you, KGB. You guys take care of me now. I’ve done this.
I’ve demonstrated that I’m holding nothing back. You guys take care of me.”266
This decision provided Ames with more than enough money to repay his debts.
Ames “handed over the names of virtually every CIA intelligence source in the Soviet
Union, sending ten to their execution and many others to prison. For this he was
eventually paid $2.7 million by the KGB and promised another $1.9 million, for a total of
$4.6 million.”267 Ames handed over some of America’s most important agents, like
Dmitri Polyakov, who had provided information to the FBI of the Soviet Union’s foreign
affairs with China and their role in the Gulf War.268 The information that Ames delivered
to the KGB essentially dismantled the entire covert network that the United States had
working within the Soviet Union.269 This information set the American government back
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many steps in its attempt to develop a large and informative intelligence network within
the Soviet Union.
Despite Ames’ successful espionage, his noted carelessness still remained in
many aspects of his life. He became extremely wealthy from his spying for the Soviet
Union, but failed to hide it. Ames spent his money on lavish commodities like a Jaguar
and a new house, which still went undetected by his supervisor.270 The way that Ames
was spending his money was a clear sign of his espionage, as he would have never been
able to afford these items on his usual government salary. Nevertheless, it took the FBI
eight years until they came to the logical conclusion that the drunk and careless employee
who lived a lavish lifestyle might be the spy. 271 The FBI conducted a ten-month
investigation before they convicted Aldrich Ames to a life sentence because of his
crimes.272
While the Ames case was one of the worst breeches in American intelligence, it
was still second to that of Robert Hanssen. Hanssen’s spying has become one of the most
notorious scandals in Cold War espionage. Hanssen provided the Soviet Union with even
more information than what Ames was able to provide to them. His story shocked the
intelligence community and the rest of the United States.
Hanssen grew up in Illinois and spent years trying to figure out his true passion.
He met his wife, Bonnie, while he studied dentistry, but he would not pursue a career in
the medical field.273 Hanssen followed his father’s footsteps and joined the Chicago
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Police Force until 1976 when he started to work at the FBI.274 During his time working
for the police force, Hanssen attended “a secret counterintelligence school to learn how to
install bugs and other high-tech surveillance equipment.”

275

His interest in

counterintelligence prompted his decision to join the FBI and prove to his father that he
would not be a failure.276
Hanssen and his family moved to a small suburb outside of New York City when
he started working as a special agent.277 The two were very religious followers of the
Opus Dei sect of Christianity, so much so that many times Robert tried to push his
religion on others.278 Hanssen and Bonnie had six children that he would try to support in
their modest, yet still expensive home.279 During the FBI’s investigation into Hanssen in
2002, he confessed that it was because of this situation that he began his espionage. He is
quoted in David Wise’s book Spy as saying, “I wanted to get a little money and to get out
of it.... the pressure of supporting a growing family in New York City on an inadequate
Bureau salary.” 280 Furthermore, Hanssen’s religious affiliation also alludes to this
conclusion. The Opus Dei sect of the Roman Catholic Church was a very conservative
branch, which directly conflicts with the Soviet Union’s communist ideals of Atheism.
Therefore, Hanssen’s spying was most likely purely for money, and not because of
ideological similarities.
Hanssen began to spy for the Soviet Union in 1979 by contacting the AMTORG
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Trading Company to get in touch with a GRU agent.281 Over the years Hanssen would
deliver information through at least twenty dead-drops that his Soviet handler,
Cherkashin (the same handler as Aldrich Ames), would receive.282 Robert Hanssen’s
affidavit explained all the information he turned over and its value:
Overall, Hanssen gave the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of valuable
documentary material, according to the affidavit. The affidavit alleges that
Hanssen compromised numerous human sources of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, dozens of classified U.S. Government documents, including
“Top Secret” and “codeword” documents, and technical operations of
extraordinary importance and value. It also alleges that Hanssen
compromised FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources,
methods and operations, and disclosed to the KGB the FBI’s secret
investigation of Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, for espionage.283
In addition to all the information that Hanssen provided to the Soviet Union, he
also hurt the United States in a different way as well. In 1985, after the executions of
American agents, Valery Martynov and Sergei Motorin, who were working in the KGB,
the FBI was baffled at what went wrong.284 The FBI set up an investigation into possible
moles within the government to figure out who could have turned over American assets.
At the head of the team was Robert Hanssen. Hanssen thus humiliated the Bureau
through his performance as a Soviet informant. It was through his position and training
with the FBI that Hanssen was capable of living these two separate lives.285 Eric O’Neill,
who was assigned to act as his field operative but was actually investigating his actions,
believes that Hanssen was able to compartmentalize his two different lives very
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effectively.286 O’Neill conducted an interview with CSPAN after the release of the movie
“Breach” in 2007, which was based on the investigation into Hanssen through the eyes of
O’Neill. O’Neill explains how he believed that Hanssen did start to participate in
espionage because of money problems, but how his ego eventually began to take over
and he felt like ‘James Bond.’287 Another source, Joe Tierney (who was Hanssen’s
superior at the FBI) said that he believed Hanssen had always considered giving
information to the Soviet Union, but that the cost of living in New York “pushed him
over the edge.”288
Whatever his motive, Hanssen conducted espionage for twenty-two important
years between the United States and the Soviet Union. He began in a time of tense
relations between the two countries, which made his betrayal all the more significant.
Hanssen was eventually caught in the midst of a dead-drop in Foxstone Park, an act that
he had carried out many times before. 289 However, by this time Hanssen was not
delivering information to the Soviet Union, he was delivering it to the Russian
Federation. In 1991 Hanssen had decided to end his espionage, as it was obvious that the
Soviet Union was about to collapse.290 Nevertheless, Hanssen could not stay away and he
began to work with the newly formed Russian government in 1993.291 Therefore, when
the FBI finally caught Hanssen he was working for the Russian Federation. Hanssen’s
tenure as a spy lasted for twenty-two years until he was sentenced to life in prison.292 Part
of Hanssen’s deal denied him the right to talk about his story to the press, but gave his
286
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family his pension. 293 This punished Hanssen by prohibiting him from making any more
money from his treachery, but did not hurt his family in the process. Nevertheless,
Hanssen will remain one of the most detrimental and notorious spies of the Cold War.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Soviet spying throughout the twentieth century was a constant within the United
States. Starting in the 1930s, the Soviet Union began to place/recruit agents abroad, so
that they could get an inside look at the development of other countries. This espionage
quickly gained more importance with the onset of World War II. Not only were the
Soviets looking for information on military tactics, but they were also trying to use their
spies to learn secrets on how to develop a nuclear weapon. While the spying that was
done throughout World War II was extremely dangerous to American national security,
the spying that took place during the Cold War was just as significant, yet in a different
way. The secrets that spies like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen turned over to the
Soviet Union had a detrimental impact on the American counterintelligence system and
put the lives of many American agents in danger. As the years passed their motives for
spying also shifted. The spies from the years before and during World War II had a very
different rationale for committing espionage than the spies who turned over secrets
throughout The Cold War. Despite all of these facts, the Soviet Union was not the only
country that committed espionage during the twentieth century.
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States also had its own agents
working within the Soviet Union. For example, Oleg Penkovsky, a deputy in the Foreign
Department of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research (the Soviet
organization that gathered foreign intelligence), had spent most of his life in service to
the Soviet Union, but decided to defect to the United States in 1960.294 He began to
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disagree with the ideology of his home country and believed that by helping the United
States he would become a “soldier for freedom.”295 Penkovsky was an important asset to
the United States because he provided America with information on the Russian
intentions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which helped John F. Kennedy avoid nuclear
disaster with the USSR.296 However, like many other of the American agents working
within the Soviet Union, he was executed after the KGB learned of his treachery.297
Specifically, Jack Dunlap told the Soviet Union of Penkovsky’s spying, which ultimately
got him killed.298
Nevertheless, Penkovsky was not the only American spy working within the
Soviet Union throughout this time period. During the twentieth century there were many
spies who provided information to the United States, making the Soviet Union not the
only guilty actor in international espionage. No matter the time or relationship between
two countries, there will always be espionage occurring. It is a constant in international
relations and with increasingly more technology, the stakes get higher. This is clearly
represented through the progression of spying during the twentieth century.
The Soviet espionage that occurred during the 1930s was mainly focused on
collecting information on American industrial knowledge. In addition, organizations like
the AMTORG Trading Company were set up to help more Soviet agents get into the
United States without detection. During the pre-war period, Soviet espionage was laying
the groundwork for future espionage within the United States. Although the leaders were
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not aware that a massive World War would break out within the next decade, their work
helped them when it did occur.
Many of the Soviet spies during the pre-war period turned information over to the
Soviet Union because of ideological reasons. The USSR had just been established and
had a very unique and new form of politics. Many Americans were interested in
communism because they believed that it could be more successful than the U.S. form of
democracy and capitalism, which was failing in the midst of the Great Depression. Spies
like Nicolas Dozenberg and Whittaker Chambers used their affiliation with the
Communist Party of the United States of America to spy for the Soviet Union. Since the
Soviet Union knew that the Americans in the CPUSA had an ideological affiliation with
communism, they were more likely to trust them when they were asked to spy for the
Soviet cause.
Many of the spies that provided secrets before World War II were very successful
because of the laxity of the American government’s counterintelligence system.
Katherine Sibley’s book Red Spies in America explains how the Soviet’s were able to
take advantage of the United States’ underdeveloped counterintelligence system in the
1930s because of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of international openness. She describes
how “Moscow was free then to conduct a wide-scale effort to gather American industrial
information from factory inspection tours and a network of strategically placed agents
and contacts of the NKVD.”299 Therefore, it was not because of the negligent American
counterintelligence network that many of the Soviet spies were caught, it was actually
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because of agents like Whittaker Chambers, who turned themselves (and other spies) in
years later when he defected back to the United States.
While the information that spies turned over to their Soviet counterparts was
significant during the years before the war, its importance increased substantially during
World War II. Although the United States and the Soviet Union were allies when the U.S.
joined the war effort in 1941, the Soviets still had their spies operating within America.
However, the stakes were significantly raised during the war period. Not only was there
greater technological information for the United States to hide, but the Soviet spies also
infiltrated increasingly more important positions within the American government. For
example, spies were both some of the chief architects of the atomic project as well as the
directors of the International Monetary Fund during World War II.
These wartime spies worked for the Soviet Union for similar reasons as the spies
who provided information before the war broke out. The incentive to give information
over to the Soviet Union came from their ideological commitment to Communism. For
example, spies like Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Victor Perlo, and Jacob Golos provided
information to the USSR because of their affiliation with the CPUSA and their belief that
communism would survive the test of time. Klaus Fuchs, a German refugee and one of
the most important war time spies for the Soviet Union, turned over information to them
because he believed that communism was the only way to end Nazism.300 Like many
other atomic spies, he believed that the United States would not care if the Soviet Union
did not survive the war.301 Many of the atomic spies provided information to Russia
because they believed in the idea of sharing scientific knowledge, especially with
300
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countries that were their allies. They did this in an attempt to not only get the bomb
finished and functional before their enemies did, but so that one country (the United
States) would not have all nuclear power when the project was completed.
It was also during World War II that the American government learned how to
deal with espionage. When first confronted with the issue of espionage, the American
leadership was much more concerned with maintaining an amicable relationship with the
Soviet Union than prosecuting their spies. Spies like Abraham Glasser and Nicolas
Dozenberg were never convicted for their spying, but were either punished by losing their
jobs or were convicted of a lesser offense (like passport fraud for Dozenberg). During the
years when the Soviet Union and the United States were allies, FDR was careful to not
strain relations, but instead handled situations like this quietly.302 However, with the
onset of war, the American government stepped up its defenses against spying. The
powers of the FBI were expanded while the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency were both created. By the end of the 1950s, the American
counterintelligence system had been completely refocused and many more employees
were now working in counter espionage.303 Furthermore, spy trials became a constant in
America at the end of the 1950s, which drastically changed the American mindset. The
Rosenbergs were treated much differently than their earlier counterparts, Glasser and
Dozenberg. The Rosenbergs were given the death penalty when they would not confess
to their crimes, which heightened American apprehension about the Soviet threat.
However, despite the increased awareness of the American counterintelligence
system, there were still Soviet spies operating within the United States throughout the rest
302
303

Sibley, 243.
Sibley, 246.

76

of the twentieth century. Many of these spies had very different reasons for handing over
information to the Soviet Union than the spies of the past. The ideological argument for
espionage ended with the beginning of the Cold War. In Michael J. Sulick’s book Spying
in America; he quotes the Department of Defense study on espionage by Americans
between 1947-2001:
Americans most consistently have cited money as the dominant motive for
espionage and over time money has increased in predominance among
motives… Of individuals who professed a single motive for espionage,
one-forth of the civilians and three-fourths of the military claimed they
had spied for money.304
This was clearly the case for the majority of the spies who worked for the Soviet Union
throughout the Cold War. However, there was still a minority that claims that they gave
information to the USSR for ideological reasons. For example, both Bernon F. Mitchell
and William H. Martin gave secrets over to the Soviet Union because they believed life
was better in the Soviet Union. However, their opinions were based on what they read in
the Soviet propaganda magazines, like Soviet Life and USSR.305 The two believed that the
Soviet Union was a much more just place than the United States and were shocked when
they learned that they were ignorant of the truth.
Despite the misconceptions of these two spies, many of the other people who
spied were in it because of money. Spies Jack Dunlap and Aldrich Ames were extremely
flashy with the money that they received, which soon became one of the leading
indicators that someone was involved in espionage.306 However, the era of Cold War
espionage was not only defined by a different set of motives, but by an increased
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importance of the information that was given over to the Soviet Union. While many of
these spies still handed over secrets about American military capacity, some of the spies
began to give details on Americans spying in the Soviet Union. Aldrich Ames and Robert
Hanssen each sent as many as ten men to their deaths because of their own selfish greed.
The spying that occurred during both World War II and the Cold War far
outranked the espionage of the 1920s and 1930s. The stealing of atomic secrets was an
egregious crime against the United States and it heightened the tensions between the two
countries once the war ended. Nevertheless, the secrets that were transferred during the
Cold War were also very detrimental to the United States. Not only did this information
lead to the deaths of some of the America’s highest ranked spies within the Soviet Union,
but it also dismantled the American Intelligence system at a time of high anxiety,
especially with the Soviet Union.
This spying did not end when the Soviet Union collapsed. Spies like Harold
James Nicholson began to work within the year after the USSR was no more. Nicholson
also betrayed the United States because of similar reasons to the Cold War spies.
Although the Cold War had technically ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
betrayal of information by Americans is still an important issue considering the United
States influential presence in international politics. The spies of more recent years have
been in it for reasons of money and ego, which is much different than the spies of the
1930s and 1940s. Throughout the twenty-first century there have also been SVR agents
working within the United States: for example, spies like Anna Chapman, Yevgeny
Buryakov, and Igor Sporyshev all spied for the Russian Federation, but were caught in
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2010.307 If anything, these arrests are further proof that this cycle of espionage will
continue on in future years.
The spying that occurred on America throughout the existence of the Soviet
Union provides a good example of how complex international relations can be.
Throughout the many relationships that the Soviet Union and the United States have had
(through their economic and wartime allegiance to their standoff during the Cold War),
spying on one another was always a must. However, depending on when the spy was
collecting information the importance of what they collected changed. For example, what
the spies gave to the Soviet Union before World War II was of much less importance than
what the Cold War spies gave to the USSR because it was truly detrimental to the safety
of American lives. While Soviet spying on the United States explains where much of the
tension and fear came from during the Cold War, it also made the American
counterintelligence system improve itself. Spying will always exist because it is the most
effective way for a country to prepare against an unforeseen attack. Unfortunately, this
fact is extremely clear after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The role of
espionage continues to heighten as increased technology allows for countries to access
even deeper into their enemies’ defenses. No matter who the spy is or when they are
active, they all understand that information is power.
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